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We show how an adversary can emulate a Bell inequality using existing detector control methods
if the Bell test is not loophole-free. For a Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality, our model fakes
a maximum violation predicted by quantum mechanics for a detector efficiency up to the threshold
efficiency of about 0.8284. When the inequality is re-calibrated by incorporating non-detection
events, our model emulates its exact local bound. Thus existing technologies may allow the adversary
to practically subvert quantum protocols all the way up to the local limit, which hints that Bell
tests need to be loophole-free for their correct application.
I. INTRODUCTION
More than 50 years ago, John Stewart Bell showed that
any physical theory based on the assumptions of locality
(i.e., nothing can communicate faster than light) and re-
alism (i.e., physical properties of an object are fixed and
pre-defined) must satisfy a set of statistical criteria called
Bell inequalities [1]. That is, if a Bell-type experiment is
performed and the results show a violation of a Bell in-
equality, then the underlying physical process cannot be
explained by a local theory. This kind of tests are called
Bell tests and the violation of the inequality is called
Bell violation. Since the earlier demonstrations utilizing
cascade decays in atoms [2–5], Bell violations have been
observed in tests utilizing nonlinear optical processes [6–
9], ions [10], neutral atoms [11], Josephson junction [12]
and solid state qubits [13]. The implications of the Bell
test not only change our understanding of nature, but
also find application in device independent (DI) quan-
tum communications [14–16], randomness generation and
amplification [17–19], DI-verified quantum computation
[20, 21], certifying quantum devices [18, 22, 23] and DI
bit commitment [24]. Entanglement, a necessary precon-
dition for unconditional security [25, 26] in quantum key
distribution, can also be certified from the violation of
a Bell inequality, independently of the underlying imple-
mentation details. This paves the way for the device-
independent tests of security [27, 28]. However, for the
observed Bell violation to be conclusive, it is important
that the Bell test is loophole-free.
More specifically, a loophole-free Bell test is an en-
tanglement experiment that requires multiple implemen-
tation loopholes such as the detection, locality, and
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measurement-independent loopholes to be closed simul-
taneously. Here, we focus on the detection loophole, and
defer the rest to Ref. [29]. In general, the detection loop-
hole is a scenario in which the observed Bell violation (a
test statistics) is no longer reliable as the measurement
sample and may not be a true representative of the popu-
lation (i.e., the entire measurement statistics). Crucially,
this situation commonly happens in practice as practical
detectors have finite detection efficiencies and hence one
could end up with samples that are non-representative.
While the detection loophole is not an issue for non-
adversarial settings, the same is not true for the case of
quantum cryptography since an adversary can take ad-
vantage of it to come up with a local model to fake Bell
violations [30]. For this reason, much effort has been
devoted to closing the detection loophole in practice.
How a local model can theoretically simulate non-local
correlations – taking advantage of the detection loophole
– has already been reported in the literature [31, 32].
However, methods of experimentally implementing such
correlations using practical means have rarely been dis-
cussed, despite the importance in practical quantum
cryptography. The state-of-the art method is arguably
that of Ref. [30], where the authors demonstrated how
an adversary could implement a local model using ex-
isting optical detector control methods to violate a Bell
inequality for active basis choice schemes. However,
their local model is effective only for a detector effi-
ciency of up to η = 0.5, while theoretically it is possi-
ble fake the inequality for a threshold efficiency of up to
ηT = 2(
√
2− 1) ≈ 0.8284 (here, efficiency η refers to the
probability that one party observes a conclusive outcome
given a measurement is made). In this article, we dis-
cuss how to experimentally fake the violation for higher
efficiencies. More specifically, we show how existing opti-
cal detector control methods [33–35] can be exploited to
not only fake the violation of standard Bell type inequal-
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FIG. 1. Setup for a CHSH test. The measurement angles
shown are arbitrary.
ities all the way up to the threshold efficiency but also
simulate the local bound of more general Bell inequal-
ities. Our results point out once again that when Bell
tests are performed for certifying randomness, guaran-
teeing security in quantum communications, or detect-
ing non-locality, they should either be performed with
an efficiency at which the test is robust against detection
loopholes, or should use the bound given by more gen-
eral inequalities (for example, Eq. (3) presented later).
Otherwise, existing detection control methods may allow
to implement a local model to simulate the results of the
test.
The Article is organized as follows. In Section II, we
outline the assumptions and methodology of the Bell test
that we consider in this Article. In Section III we present
several local models that allow an adversary to imple-
ment a practical setup to fake the Bell test or emulate
the local bounds given by the inequalities. We conclude
in Section IV.
II. ASSUMPTIONS FOR BELL TEST
The experimental setup of a Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) Bell test for two parties with binary in-
puts and outputs [36] is shown in Fig. 1. The test as-
sumes that a source of entangled photon pairs sends each
member of the pairs to two legitimate parties, Alice and
Bob. Alice randomly measures the polarizations along
direction α0 or α1 and Bob randomly along β0 or β1
as shown in Fig. 1. The measurement along a particu-
lar direction is performed with the help of a rotatable
half wave plate (HWP) followed by a polarization beam-
splitter (PBS) and two single photon detectors. This
type of analyzer is called an active basis choice ana-
lyzer. The possible polarization measurement outcomes
expected at Alice and Bob are PA ∈ {α0, α⊥0 , α1, α⊥1 }
and PB ∈ {β0, β⊥0 , β1, β⊥1 }, and they are mapped into
outcomes {+,−,+,−}.
We assume that Alice and Bob are situated far apart,
so that the locality loophole does not exist. However, due
to the finite efficiency of the detectors and optical losses
in the setup, it is not possible to measure the polarization
of all the photons. So, the final statistics are calculated
from post selected photons, i.e., from the photons that
have been detected. For each pair of measurement set-
tings {α, β} ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} chosen by Alice and Bob,
the correlation function E(α, β) is calculated as
E(α, β) = (1)
Nα,β(++) +Nα,β(−−)−Nα,β(+−)−Nα,β(−+)
Nα,β(++) +Nα,β(−−) +Nα,β(+−) +Nα,β(−+) ,
where Nα,β(i, j) represents the number of coincidences
with outcome {i, j} ∈ {++,+−,−+,−−} for a particu-
lar setting (α, β). The associated CHSH Bell inequality
is
SCHSH =
E(α0,β0) + E(α1, β0) + E(α1, β1)− E(α0, β1) ≤ 2.
(2)
Quantum mechanics predicts a maximum violation
of S = 2
√
2 for the setting choice α0 = −78.75◦,
α1 = 56.25
◦, β0 = 11.25◦, β1 = −33.75◦ [37], and
even stronger correlations are algebraically possible in
theory leading to S ≤ 4 [38]. However, as long as the
efficiency of a measurement is η = 1, all local models
must necessarily satisfy Eq. (2). Unfortunately, this is
not true for η < 1. In particular, when η is less than
some threshold ηT, it is possible to devise local models
that violate Eq. (2). For the CHSH test described here,
ηT = 2(
√
2 − 1) ≈ 82.84% [39]. In order to avoid this,
these tests are performed in the region η > ηT. Note
that the CHSH test is not the most robust Bell test as
one can further reduce the detection threshold by look-
ing at marginal correlations (or singles statistics). This
is given by the Eberhard Bell inequality [37], which has
a detection threshold of ηT = 2/3 ≈ 66.67%. Alterna-
tively, one can include the ‘efficiency’ in the inequality
and recalibrate it as a function of η as [39]
S′(η) = E(α0, β0) + E(α1, β0) + E(α1, β1)− E(α0, β1)
≤ 4
η
− 2.
(3)
The recalibrated CHSH Bell inequality gives the local
bound of S′ as a function of η, i.e., how much violation
is required to certify non-locality for a given efficiency.
This is shown by the solid (red) curve in Fig. 2. Note
that, when η = 1, Eq. (3) becomes Eq. (2) since the
post-selected correlation set becomes the entire measure-
ment set. Also, when η < 2/3, S′(η) > 4, which is not
physical. Thus, a local model that can simulate Eq. (3)
for efficiency range 2/3 ≤ η ≤ 1 would be the optimum
model to exploit detection loopholes in a Bell test. We
present it in the next section.
III. FAKING BELL INEQUALITY WITH
IMPROVED EFFICIENCY
For ease of understanding, we will go step by step.
First, we review an existing local model that can fake
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FIG. 2. Local bounds for recalibrated inequality S′ [Eq. (3)],
improved faking model [Eq. (6)], and perfect faking model.
The quantum mechanical bound 2
√
2 is also shown. The im-
proved faking model achieves this bound at η ≈ 0.6678 and
the perfect model at η = 2(
√
2 − 1). The perfect model can
fully emulate Eq. (3) for efficiency range 2/3 ≤ η ≤ 1.
Eq. (2) for η ≤ 1/2 [30] and point out its limitations.
Then we propose a modification to this model that en-
ables it to fake Eq. (2) up to η ≤ 2/3. We then present
our perfect model that can not only fake Eq. (2) for
η ≤ 2(√2−1) but also emulate the local bounds given by
Eq. (3). Since all three models exploit an existing detec-
tor control method – bright-light detector control [33–35]
– we first recap it.
Bright-light detector control: Single-photon detec-
tors used in a Bell test may become insensitive to single
photons when exposed to bright light [33, 40]. Even in
this mode, they can produce a detection event (‘click’)
when additionally exposed to a light pulse of intensity
I equal to or higher than a threshold level Ith. This
allows an adversary Eve to have control over the detec-
tors by tailoring I. For example, if the measurement
basis matches that of the incoming light pulse, all of it is
incident on a single detector with intensity I ≥ Ith and
results in a detection event. However, in case of basis mis-
match, the incoming light is split between two detectors
with intensity I/2 < Ith (assuming a conjugate basis)
and none of the detectors click. This is how the adver-
sary can have control over detection outcomes. The fea-
sibility of bright-light control has been confirmed numer-
ous times, with both detectors based on avalanche pho-
todiodes [33, 34, 41–45] and superconducting nanowires
[40, 46]. Next, we show how an adversary can exploit it
to implement a local-realistic model.
Conditions for violation: Let us assume that an ar-
bitrary value of |S| ≤ 4 needs to be simulated by the local
model. Assuming symmetry for each setting combination
(α, β), this implies |E| = S/4. Assuming Nα,β(++) =
Nα,β(−−) = Nsim and Nα,β(+−) = Nα,β(−+) = Ndif,
(where 2Nsim + 2Ndif = 1), Eq. 1 can be written as
Nsim
Ndif
=
1 + E
1− E . (4)
TABLE I. Probability of each polarization combination gen-
erated by the source in the existing faking model [30]. They
are normalized to maintain 2Nsim + 2Ndif = 1.
Towards Bob
β0 β
⊥
0 β1 β
⊥
1
T
ow
a
rd
s
A
li
ce α0 Nsim/4 Ndif/4 Ndif/4 Nsim/4
α⊥0 Ndif/4 Nsim/4 Nsim/4 Ndif/4
α1 Nsim/4 Ndif/4 Nsim/4 Ndif/4
α⊥1 Ndif/4 Nsim/4 Ndif/4 Nsim/4
This implies that under the assumptions specified above,
an arbitrary correlation value E requires the ratio of sim-
ilar to different outcomes to follow Eq. (4). For example,
the quantum mechanical prediction of S = 2
√
2, which
corresponds to E = ±1/√2, requires
Nsim = (3± 2
√
2)Ndif. (5)
Below we describe several techniques by which an active
attacker can satisfy this condition.
Existing model: A straightforward approach to force
the outcomes to follow Eq. (4) is to generate polariza-
tion combinations at the source with desired statistics
and then force deterministic outcomes during the mea-
surement, as done in Ref. 30. We assume each polariza-
tion combination is generated according to the probabil-
ities given in Table I, where Nsim and Ndif obey Eq. (4).
We also assume that the intensity is tailored to bring
the bright-light control method into play, i.e., matched
bases lead to deterministic outcome with unity probabil-
ity, while mismatched bases lead to no detection. Let’s
consider the case when the source generates polariza-
tion combination α0β0 (α0β1) with probability Nsim/4
(Ndif/4). They result in coincidences only for the setting
α0β0 (α0β1) and lead to deterministic similar (similar)
outcomes with unity probability. For the remaining three
setting choices, no coincidence happens and the outcomes
have no effect on the correlation. This is true for all the
polarization combinations in Table I. In this way, it is
possible to generate similar and different outcomes with
desired probability to match Eq. (4) for any desired value
of E. A problem with this method, however, is that half
of the time the measurement basis does not match the
preparation basis and results in no detection. As a result,
the efficiency at each side becomes only η = 0.5. This
is a limitation in Ref. 30. Next, we outline a way to im-
plement an improved local realistic model with a higher
detection efficiency.
Improvement to existing model: Above we have
recapped the existing first method that leads to CHSH
parameter S1 = 4 with an efficiency η1 = 0.5. We now
generate a second method that leads to CHSH parameter
S2 = 2 with efficiency η2 = 1. For this, let’s assume that
the source always sends polarization α (β) to Alice (Bob),
4TABLE II. Possible outcomes and the corresponding probabilities for different measurement settings in the perfect model.
Outcome ij ∈ {++,+−,−+,−−} represents i at Alice and j at Bob.
Polarization
emitted
from source
Joint setting Single setting
α0β0 α1β0 α1β1 α0β1 α1 β0
Outcome Prob. Outcome Prob. Outcome Prob. Outcome Prob. Outcome Prob. Outcome Prob.
α0β0 ++ a/2 ++ b/4 +− b/4 +− a/2 + b/4 + 1/2
−+ b/4 −− b/4 − b/4
α1β1 ++ b/4 ++ a/2 ++ a/2 ++ b/4 + a/2 + 1/2
−+ b/4 −+ b/4
where α (β) is polarized at an angle that is midway be-
tween α0 and α1 (β0 and β1). In this case, irrespective of
the measurement settings, the input intensity I is split
at a ratio of cos2(φA) : sin
2(φA) between the two detec-
tors in Alice and at cos2(φB) : sin
2(φB) in Bob. Here,
φA = |α1 − α0|/2 and φB = |β1 − β0|/2. Tailoring the
intensity to satisfy I cos2(φ) ≥ Ith and I sin2(φ) < Ith
at the respective sides ensures that only one of the de-
tectors clicks (with outcome +), irrespective of the basis
choice, and efficiency stays 1. This will result in E = +1
for each measurement setting and lead to a CHSH pa-
rameter S2 = 2 with an efficiency η2 = 1. Note that
this method (presented here for its ease of explanation)
results in only ++ outcomes. It can be symmetricized to
produce all four outcomes ++, +−, −+, −−, which we
omit for brevity.
Thus, we have outlined two independent approaches to
control S: the first one leads to S1 = 4 with an efficiency
η1 = 0.5, while the second one leads to S2 = 2 with effi-
ciency η2 = 1. An adversary can then use a probabilistic
mixture of these two approaches to increase the faking ef-
ficiency of the Bell test. With probability p1 (p2 = 1−p1)
she uses the first (second) method. The input intensity
needs to be tailored to 2Ith > I ≥ Ith/ cos2(φ) to en-
sure that the first (second) method leads to detection
efficiency of η1 = 0.5 (η2 = 1) and results in S1 = 4
(S2 = 2). The resultant efficiency as seen by Alice and
Bob will be η =
√
p1η21 + p2η
2
2 and the improved CHSH
parameter will be
Simp =
p1S1η
2
1 + p2S2η
2
2
η2
. (6)
The variation of Simp with η is shown in Fig. 2. The left-
most point (η, Simp) = (0.5, 4) corresponds to the first
method with p2 = 0. As p2 is increased, Simp becomes
smaller with increasing efficiency and eventually becomes
(η, Simp) = (1, 2) at the rightmost point with p2 = 1.
Quantum mechanical prediction S = 2
√
2 is obtained
at p2 ≈ 0.2612 and the corresponding efficiency is η ≈
0.6678. This is still lower than the threshold efficiency
limit ηT = 2(
√
2− 1) ≈ 0.8284 for CHSH inequality. To
achieve higher local bounds, one more degree of freedom
needs to be introduced, as discussed in our next model.
Perfect local model: Now we present a perfect local
model that can not only fake a violation of inequality (2)
for η ≤ 2(√2−1) but also emulate the local bounds given
by Eq. (3) for 2/3 ≤ η ≤ 1. For this model, we make three
assumptions. First, we assume that the adversary at the
source always generates one of the two polarization com-
binations {α0, β0} and {α1, β1} with equal probability of
1/2 each. Second, we assume that the adversary chooses
the light intensity towards Bob in such a way that they
result in a deterministic outcome with unity probability.
For the ease of analysis we will assume that the polar-
izations {β0, β1}, at Bob, lead to deterministic outcomes
{+,+} and {−,+} with unity efficiency when measured
along β0 and β1 respectively (however, any other out-
comes will also do as long as they are deterministic and
unity probability). Third, we assume that at Alice, when-
ever the measurement basis matches (does not match)
that of the incoming light, a deterministic (random) out-
come is produced with probability a (b). Such detector
control can be achieved using a method similar to that
presented above in the improvement to existing model,
as detailed in Appendix A. For each setting, the possi-
ble outcomes at Alice and Bob and the corresponding
coincidence probabilities are shown in Table II. For any
measurement setting {α, β}, the correlation function E
is related to a and b as
|E| =
a
2 +
b
4 − b4
a
2 + 2
b
4
=
a
a+ b
, (7)
and the coincidence probability is
a
2
+
b
2
= η2. (8)
Solving Eqs. (7) and (8), we get,
a =2Eη2
b =2(1− E)η2 (9)
Thus, to emulate the local bounds in an actual experi-
ment having detector efficiency η, an adversary can use
Eq. (3) to calculate the maximum correlation value E
corresponding to that η, and then use Eq. (9) to set the
values of a, b. As long as Eq. (9) is maintained, the sin-
gle click probability during the test is equal to η and the
CHSH value is equal to the bound as shown by the thick
black dashed line in Fig. 2. For example, for a Bell test
5done with detector efficiency η = 2(
√
2 − 1), the local
bound is S′ = 2
√
2 according to Eq. (3). This can be
attained – according to Eq. (9) – if a = 12
√
2−16 = 0.97
and b = 40 − 28√2 = 0.40, which leads to |E| = 1/√2.
Similarly, the local bound of S′ [Eq. (3)] can be achieved
for any 2/3 ≤ η ≤ 1. For η < 2/3, the local bound be-
comes unrealistic S′ > 4 [Eq. (3)], which requires b to be
negative, which is impossible in practice. This concludes
our local model that can emulate the local bounds given
by Eq. (3) for every value of 2/3 ≤ η ≤ 1.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it is a known fact that a local theory can
violate a Bell inequality up to a threshold detection effi-
ciency, it is rarely addressed in the literature how an ad-
versary can actually implement it. In this work, we have
shown that the existing detector control method can be
exploited to implement a local model that can fake the
CHSH Bell inequality [Eq. (2)] up to the threshold ef-
ficiency. Our model can also simulate the local bound
of the calibrated CHSH Bell inequality [Eq. (3)] for effi-
ciency over 2/3. Our results point out that whenever Bell
violations are used for testing less-conventional theories,
implementing device-independent quantum secure com-
munication [27], certifying randomness [18] and nonlocal-
ity, loophole-free Bell tests [47–49] should be performed.
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Appendix A: Strategies for controlling a and b
Here we show that regardless of the value of α0 and
α1 an adversary can satisfy the assumption that when-
ever the Alice’s basis matches (does not match) that of
the incoming light, a deterministic (random) outcome is
produced with probability a (b). For simplicity, let us as-
sume the case when the adversary sends a light polarized
at angle α0 towards Alice (strategies for the other polar-
izations are similar). Then, with probability (a− b), she
sends light polarized at angle α0 which, when measured
in the same (different) basis, results in detection (no de-
tection) if intensity is tailored properly (see Table III).
With probability b/2, she sends the light at an angle mid-
way between α0 and α1 (α
⊥
1 ) at angle α0 +φ1 (α0−φ⊥1 ).
Here, φ1 = |α0 − α1|/2, φ⊥1 = |α0 − α⊥1 |/2. As a re-
sult, when the basis matches, for both the cases, out-
come is α0 while for basis mismatch the outcome is α1
and α⊥1 with probability b/2. The condition for this is
I sin2 φ < Ith < I cos
2(φ) for φ ∈ {φ1, φ⊥1 } as shown
in Table III. For the remaining times (with probability
1 − a), the adversary sends vacuum. Overall, from Ta-
ble III, it can be seen that when the basis matches that of
the incoming light, it results in a deterministic outcome
with probability a; while when the basis mismatches, it
results in a random outcome with probability b. This
supports the practicality of our assumption. Note that
this method leads to asymmetric detection efficiency, as
Bob’s efficiency is always higher than Alice’s. However,
this can be avoided by reversing the roles of Alice and
Bob half of the time.
We have so far assumed that the blinded detector is
controllable as a step function: for I < Ith the click
probability is 0, and for I ≥ Ith it is 1. This is of
course a simplification [33–35, 40–45]. Real detectors
have noise, which leads to them having two thresholds
Inever < Ialways, with click probability 0 for I ≤ Inever and
1 for I ≥ Ialways. In the range Inever < I < Ialways, the
click probability gradually increases from 0 to 1. These
thresholds depend on the blinding power and regime.
Furthermore, no two detector samples are identical, and
require tweaking the faked states to achieve perfect or
near-perfect control [34, 35, 44]. Generally, if the ratio
Ialways/Inever can be made sufficiently small, perfect con-
trol can be achieved. These issues are device-specific and
should be treated at the implementation stage. However,
the ability to obtain an arbitrary click probability by ad-
justing I may allow an alternative method of controlling
a and b, as we show below.
Practical detectors, when blinded, gradually increase
their click probability from 0 to 1 in a certain range
of trigger intensity I [33–35, 40–45]. This can be
used to obtain probabilistic detections. To illustrate
this, we have measured control characteristics of one
avalanche photodiode detector in a commercial QKD sys-
tem Clavis2 [45, 50]. At a particular continuous-wave
blinding power, we varied the trigger pulse energy and
recorded the corresponding click probability as shown in
Fig. 3. The result shows that it is in principle possible
for an adversary to select a value of trigger pulse inten-
sity I (without varying the polarization by ±φ) that in a
matching basis leads to click probability 1 in one detec-
tor, and when halved owing to basis mismatch, leads to a
random click in either detector with probability ∼ 0.40.
However, some double clicks (i.e., simultaneous clicks in
both detectors) will happen in this strategy. Their han-
dling in a Bell test will need to be considered.
6TABLE III. Strategy to practically simulate deterministic (random) outcome with efficiency a (b). Here, φ0 = |α0 − α1|/2,
φ1 = |α0 − α⊥1 |/2, and ‘x’ represents no detection.
Probability Intensity Polarization
Outcome when basis
Required value of I
matches mismatches
a− b I α0 α0 x I ≥ Ith, I cos2(2φ0) < Ith, I sin2(2φ0) < Ith
b/2 I α0 + φ0 α0 α1 I sin
2(φ0) < Ith ≤ I cos2(φ0)
b/2 I α0 − φ1 α0 α⊥1 I sin2(φ1) < Ith ≤ I cos2(φ1)
1− a vacuum x x
255 260 265 270 275
0
0.5
1
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lic
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0
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1
Trigger pulse energy (fJ)
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(a)
(b)
FIG. 3. Control characteristics of a detector in commercial
quantum key distribution system Clavis2 [45, 50], responding
to a short trigger pulse atop continuous-wave blinding power
of (a) 740 µW and (b) 367 µW. Wavelength of light was
∼ 1.55 µm.
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